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Chapter 1: Introduction to Thesis 
Introduction to Public Funding: 
Campaign spending is an important aspect of any election since the amount that a 
candidate spends towards an election can have a significant impact on the results. For this reason, 
public funding becomes an important factor in the outcome of elections where public funding is 
available and is used by one or more of the candidates in a race. Over the past forty years, public 
funding has been growing in popularity for state elections (Wattson 2002). Currently, twenty-
five states provide some variation of public funding for their political candidates (National 
Conference of State Legislatures hereafter as NCSL 2013). 
Public funding is a fairly new concept for democracy and it is constantly evolving. 
Although the primary purpose of public funding programs is to make candidates more 
responsible to citizens, and less dependent on campaign contributions from PACs and interest 
groups, public funding also provides opportunities for atypical candidates, such as candidates 
from demographics that are under represented in office, candidates who are not independently 
wealthy, and candidates who have not previously held office, to run for office. When candidates 
use public funding, elections between incumbents and challengers become more competitive, 
which in turn can lead to a better democracy (Briffault 1999, 563). Challengers can benefit 
greatly from public funding since they have the ability to run a campaign with a greater chance 
of success and since they are able to spend a larger amount of money earlier on in the race than 
they would without public funding. Likewise, public funding can reduce the incumbency 
advantage, since the candidates would have a more equal amount of money to spend on their 
campaigns, which leads to an equal opportunity to spread their campaign messages. As a result, 
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public funding creates a greater chance for the candidate with the best message instead of the 
largest budget to win an election. 
Since many incumbents view public funding as a threat to their incumbency advantage, 
these incumbents have attempted to prevent the scope in which public funding can be used in an 
election. As a result, there have been several Supreme Court cases that have resulted in limiting 
public funding’s effectiveness by striking down certain aspects of public funding laws. However, 
some incumbents accept public funding in their campaigns because there are advantages for 
them, including not having to spend time fundraising, which gives them more time to focus on 
campaigning. 
 The meaning and scope of public funding varies from state to state. Generally, state 
governments provide public funding or public financing to candidates or parties, in varying 
amounts depending on the program, in exchange for an agreement from the recipients of funding 
to abide by limits on their ability to accept and spend contributions from outside sources (NCSL 
2013). State public funding programs vary immensely from partial-subsidy programs to full 
public funding programs that can be provided either to a political party or directly to a candidate 
(NCSL 2013). In this study, I will focus on programs that provide money directly to candidates, I 
will primarily focus on the states with full public funding programs, which are Connecticut, 
Maine, and Arizona, and I will analyze Minnesota’s subsidy program for a comparison between 
a subsidy program and the full public funding programs. 
Introduction to Chapter: 
The main purpose of this chapter is to state my research question, to state my hypothesis, 
to discuss why I selected my question, to discuss how my research will differ from existing 
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literature on the subject, to talk about why my question is important, and to outline the remainder 
of the thesis. 
Statement of Research Question and How it was Selected: 
In this paper, I will explain the purpose of public funding, discuss how public financing 
laws can impact election, and analyze the impact of Connecticut, Maine, Arizona, and 
Minnesota’s public funding laws in order to provide a better understanding of the significance of 
implementing public funding laws. Specifically, I will focus on state legislative elections and 
compare the amount of candidates who accept public funding, to see how effectively the states 
can incentivize candidates and to compare the competitiveness of elections. Additionally, I will 
compare the competitiveness of elections with public funding to elections without public funding 
to see which state’s public funding program has the greatest difference in competitiveness 
between elections with funding and those without funding. 
My research questions are: “ Among the states that provide full public funding for their 
legislative candidates, which state is most successfully able to provide public funding programs 
that incentivize their state legislative candidates to accept the limitations of their public financing 
laws?” and “Which state has the most competitive elections among major party legislative 
candidates who accept public funding for their campaigns?” 
 During the spring of my junior year I worked as a research assistant for Professor Diana 
Evans as she gathered data on Connecticut’s clean election program. At the end of the semester, 
as a requirement to receive credit, I wrote a paper about the data. Through my research about the 
clean election program, I became interested in public funding and how it could differ among 
states that have similar programs. 
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As I furthered my research on public funding, I learned more about the purposes behind 
these programs. As a result, I decided to focus on the ability of the program to incentivize 
candidates to accept public funding, since the program cannot be successful without willing 
participants. Additionally, I wanted to see if there was an increase in competitiveness as a result 
of public funding between candidates who both receive public funding and between candidates 
where one candidate receives public funding and one does not, so that I could compare the 
change in competitiveness with two candidates who did not receive public funding and then 
compare the differences among the states I selected. An increase in competitiveness when public 
funding is used is important because it would seem that challengers would consider it before 
deciding to accept public funding since they also have to agree to the limitations that come with 
public funding, including spending only money provided through public funding. Additionally, 
these factors become important to citizens who would want more competitive elections since 
competitive elections are an important factor for a good democracy. It is also important for states 
with public funding to consider maintaining their public funding programs and for states without 
public funding programs to consider creating a public funding program for their candidates. 
In deciding which data to focus my research on, I first decided to focus on the state 
legislative candidates because they would provide the greatest sample size for my analysis. Then, 
I used the information provided by the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) on 
public funding to determine which type of programs I should focus my attention on. From the 
NCSL, I found that Maine, Arizona, and Connecticut all provided full public funding for their 
legislators and each had fairly new public financing laws. I chose to analyze these states and 
Minnesota, because Minnesota was the first state to provide a public funding option for their 
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candidates and because their program differed the most from the full public funding programs, 
since Minnesota provides subsidy instead of grants. 
Hypothesis: 
 For the first portion of my research question, in order to measure the ability for public 
funding to incentivize state legislative candidates to accept the limitations of their public 
financing laws, I will compare the percentage of candidates who accept public funding in each 
state. My hypothesis is that Maine, Connecticut, and Arizona will have similar success in their 
ability to provide public funding programs because they each offer similar public funding 
options. To the contrary, Minnesota will be less able to incentivize candidates because, 
Minnesota’s program seems to be less successful in creating competitive elections based on 
Donnay and Ramsden’s findings, in which they determined that Minnesota’s public funding 
typically adversely affected the challengers’ vote percentage. This will be discussed further in 
chapter 3 and because Minnesota offers less funding than the other states do (Donnay and 
Ramsden 1995). 
For my second research question, I hypothesize that the state that has the most 
competitive elections among major party legislative candidates who accept public funding for 
their campaigns is Arizona. This is because Arizona had the most competitive elections among 
major party legislative candidates who accept public funding for their campaigns in Malhotra’s 
study, where he concluded that Arizona has more competitive elections than Maine because 
Arizona has larger districts so providing more money to candidates makes a bigger impact than 
in Maine (Malhotra 2008, 275-276). Since Connecticut also has significantly smaller districts 
than Arizona I expect to similarly find through my research that Arizona has more competitive 
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elections than Maine and Connecticut when both major party legislative candidates accept public 
funding (Malhotra 2008, 275-276). Additionally, since Minnesota has a different program that is 
more limited than Arizona, Connecticut, and Maine in that they provide subsidies instead of full 
public funding and since Donnay and Ramsden find Minnesota’s public subsidy program to 
adversely affect the challenger, I expect that Minnesota will provide the smallest change in 
competitiveness between elections where neither major party candidate accepted public funds 
and where both major party candidates accept public funds (1995). 
How I differ: 
My research will analyze and compare the public financing laws in the four states that 
currently provide public funding for their state legislatures. In the existing literature on public 
financing in state legislatures, scholars have studied each state’s programs individually, or 
collectively without comparison of all the full public funding programs, although Malhotra 
compared Maine’s program with Arizona’s program (2008) . As a result, there is a lack of 
comparison between states, which is the gap that I would like to fill through my research. In 
doing this, I hope that there will be a better understanding of which aspects of public funding 
programs are most effective in incentivizing candidates to participate and to foster competitive 
elections among those who accept public funding. In demonstrating the overall benefit of public 
funding among these states, I will show the possible benefit that these programs could have on 
states that currently do not have public funding programs. 
Why Analyzing Public Funding is Important: 
 These research questions are important because looking further into how public funding 
can affect elections and comparing these results among states with these programs could provide 
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more information for states that might consider providing public funding for their legislative 
candidates so that they could provide their candidates with the best program possible. 
Additionally, campaign spending is one of the most important factors in election results since 
spending by a candidate increases their name recognition. Allowing challengers to have access to 
more money earlier in the race decreases incumbency advantage, which can provide fairer 
elections. 
Outline of Thesis: 
In chapter two, I will primarily provide a literature review on public funding. I will explain 
some of the theories behind public funding to provide information on what types of research has 
already been done on public funding. Then, after providing background information on the 
purposes of public funding, in order to better explain the importance of public funding, I will 
discuss some of the key attempts and successes at implementing public funding in the United 
States, primarily at the congressional and presidential level. Then, to show other variations of 
public funding and the impact that they have made on elections, I will provide insight on the 
general reasons as to why the state public funding laws are the way they are. Finally, I will 
discuss court decisions that have impacted public funding programs.  
In chapter three, I will focus on the actual laws that are in place and the histories on public 
funding in Connecticut, Maine, Arizona, and Minnesota. After providing background and history 
of public funding in the state legislatures that I am covering in this paper, I will explain how I 
selected the states that I am analyzing. Then, I will discuss literature written about each state and 
their actual law. Finally, I will compare and contrast the current programs from each state in 
order to highlight possible factors that could affect my results. 
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In chapter four, I discuss the method I used in collecting and analyzing the data and I will 
explain why certain variables were chosen and then I analyze the data collected on state 
legislature elections in Connecticut, Maine, Arizona, and Minnesota. Finally, I provide the 
results from my data analysis. 
Chapter five will be my concluding chapter. After summarizing my research, I will further 
discuss the conclusions from chapter four and discuss the possible reasons for the results that 
were found. Finally, I will discuss the future of public funding and impact of public funding on 
the democratic process.  
Summary: 
 In this paper I plan to analyze existing state public funding programs, which I hope will 
lead to a better understanding of the possible benefits of public funding. I will conduct this 
analysis by explaining existing literature on public funding, discussing public financing laws, 
and collecting and analyzing data on public funding from Maine, Arizona, Connecticut, and 
Minnesota. 
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Chapter 2: Background on Public Funding 
Chapter Introduction: 
 In order to understand how public funding developed into the way that it is now typically 
implemented, it is important to review the history of public funding. Additionally, it is important 
to understand the reasons for implementing public funding in order to understand the reason for 
my research question. In this chapter, I will provide a literature review; discuss the purpose of 
public funding and the theories that have been developed regarding public funding; give a brief 
history of public funding; discuss important court decisions regarding public funding; and 
explain the significance of this information to my comparison of state public funding programs. 
Literature Review on Campaign Funding: 
One of the most important articles that explain some of the effect of campaign spending is 
“The Effects of Campaign Spending in Congressional Elections” by Gary Jacobson (1978). 
Jacobson focuses on the effects of spending in Congressional elections in order to gain a better 
understanding of how an increase in spending affects incumbents and challengers. He begins by 
outlining the benefits of campaign funding in his article. He demonstrates that, in Congressional 
elections, “the marginal gains from a given increase in campaign spending are much greater for 
challengers than for incumbents,” using data from the 1972 and 1974 House elections (Jacobson 
1978, 489). He does this by separating the challengers from the incumbents and tracks their 
increases in spending to determine their correlation. He determines that the marginal gains for 
the challenger occur because challengers must spend money to make themselves known to the 
public since incumbents have greater name recognition among the electorate. (Jacobson 1978, 
489). Furthermore, he concludes that overall spending by both candidates can benefit the 
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challenger more than it benefits the incumbent in an election, because spending by the challenger 
makes them more known to the electorate whereas spending on the part of the incumbent 
typically has little effect, since the incumbent is already well known in the district. As a result, 
public funding for candidates increases the competitiveness of an election (Jacobson 1978, 489; 
Malhotra 2008, 264). Even if incumbents receive an equal amount of money as a challenger 
“their additional spending does not counterbalance the effects of greater spending by challengers” 
(Jacobson 1978, 489). 
Jacobson continues his analysis on the effects of campaign spending in his article “The 
Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections: New Evidence for Old Arguments” (1990). 
He uses a survey on voting intentions taken throughout an election cycle to determine the role of 
campaign spending in House elections (Jacobson 1990, 343). Through his analysis he reasserts 
that the relationship between incumbent and challenger’s spending from his 1978 article still 
holds true, concluding that the number of votes for incumbents tends to decrease when their 
spending increases (Jacobson 1990, 334). This results from the fact that they “…spend more 
money the more strongly they are challenged, and the stronger the challenge, the worse the 
incumbent does” (Jacobson 1990, 334). He explains this loss of votes by incumbents further by 
saying that, since “…every member of Congress, saturates their districts with information about 
themselves, their virtues and services, before the formal campaign begins,” challengers must 
expend substantial resources in order to prove that they are viable candidates (Jacobson 1990, 
334). Additionally, since “voters are demonstrably reluctant to vote for candidates they know 
nothing about…” incumbents have an advantage over their challengers (Jacobson 1990, 335). 
Furthermore, Jacobson explains that “campaign spending may affect the vote, but the (expected) 
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vote affects campaign contributions”, which can make it exceedingly difficult for a challenger to 
raise funds (1990, 335). 
These analyses by Jacobson explain some of the barriers that a challenger faces in attempting 
to become a viable candidate. Because of these barriers, a challenger is most able to compete 
against an incumbent when they have served in other offices or when the challenger is able to 
spend their personal wealth on their campaign. 
In “Public Funding and Democracy”, Richard Briffault discusses campaign financing as a 
whole, as well as public funding of elections with the purpose of conveying that “public funding 
can be made to work if we take seriously the lessons from our experience with public funding so 
far” (1999, 566). Historically, public funding programs have had goals that are similar to the 
states that currently provide public funding. Briffault believes that a public finance system, as a 
whole, is central to democracy, pointing out that it creates “(i) fair and vigorous competition 
among candidates; (ii) equality of voter influence on electoral outcomes; and (iii) recognition 
that the campaign finance system can affect the integrity of the political process” (Briffault 1999, 
563). Additionally, he recognizes that most elections, in which one candidate outspends their 
opponent, are uncompetitive (Briffault 1999, 563). 
Briffault also discusses legislation that was proposed or passed as an alternative to public 
funding that we typically see on the state level. Briffault discusses two of these alternatives to 
public funding on the national level that have been suggested in the past illustrating how none of 
the alternatives encompass all the benefits that public funding provides. The first idea would be 
deregulation. On the national level, deregulation would mean a repeal of the Federal Election 
Campaign Act, which was implemented on the national level without being very effective. The 
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idea was that deregulation would “eliminate the evasions, the end-run tactics, and the fine legal 
distinctions that make a mockery of the current campaign finance laws” (Briffault 1999, 564). 
However, deregulation would not enhance the competitiveness of elections because it would not 
benefit candidates; it would only affect the transparency of elections. The second approach is to 
reform existing regulations by restricting contributions, preventing soft money contributions, and 
prohibiting issue advocacy spending, some of which has already been done (Briffault 1999, 565). 
Although this approach would help to provide cleaner elections, it is not likely to enhance 
electoral competition because it does not provide an equal amount of money to each candidate’s 
campaigns and because the candidate who spends the most will typically win (Briffault 1999, 
565). 
Mayer, Werner, and Williams discuss the theory of increased of competitiveness when public 
funding programs are implemented and determined whether public funding programs enhanced 
competitiveness in “Do Public Funding Programs Enhance Electoral Competition?” (2006). 
They did this using data “from 1990–2004, for elections to the lower house in the state 
legislatures in Arizona, Hawaii, Maine, Minnesota, and Wisconsin” and analyzing the “the 
percentage of incumbents who faced a major-party opponent,“ “the percentage of incumbents 
who were in a competitive race, defined as one in which the winner received less than 60 percent 
of the two-party vote,” and “the percentage of incumbents who ran for and were reelected to 
office” (Mayer, Werner, and Williams 2006, 256-7). In comparing “the percentage of 
incumbents who faced a major-party opponent” among the states they analyze, they found that 
Wisconsin and Arizona had the most unopposed races and Maine, Minnesota, and Hawaii having 
much higher percentages of competitive races (Mayer, Werner, and Williams 2006, 258). When 
analyzing “the percentage of incumbents who were in a competitive race, defined as one in 
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which the winner received less than 60 percent of the two-party vote,” they found that Hawaii, 
Maine, and Minnesota increase in competitiveness through the election years they analyzed 
(Mayer, Werner, and Williams 2006, 259). Additionally, they found that Wisconsin was by far 
the least competitive of the states (Mayer, Werner, and Williams 2006, 259). For “the percentage 
of incumbents who ran for and were reelected to office,” Wisconsin, again, had the least 
competitive elections; however, each state analyzed saw a drop in incumbent re-election rates 
from1990 to 2004 (Mayer, Werner, and Williams 2006, 260-1). 
In addition to their analysis, they provide four arguments for why public funding enhances 
competition. The first argument is that there is a vicious cycle in which candidates without 
money are not taken seriously so people do not contribute to their campaign (Mayer, Werner, 
and Williams 2006, 245). This can make it difficult for potential challengers, especially 
challengers without personal wealth (Mayer, Werner, and Williams 2006, 245). The second point 
is that public funding reduces the incumbent’s advantage over the challenger to fundraise for 
their campaign (Mayer, Werner, and Williams 2006, 246). Their third point is that public funding 
reduces the amount of influence contributors have on candidates when the take office, making 
officeholder more accountable to their constituents (Mayer, Werner, and Williams 2006, 246). 
The last argument is that public funding can cut campaign cost, since candidates are not trying to 
outspend each other (Mayer, Werner, and Williams 2006, 246). 
Background on the Purposes of Public Funding and Theories: 
Several states, such as Connecticut, originally implemented their public funding programs as 
a result of recent scandals in an effort to make officials more accountable. However, although 
public funding programs not only make candidates more responsible to citizens, or less 
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dependent on campaign contributions from PACs and interest groups, they provide opportunities 
for candidates (Malhotra 2008, 264). In particular, prospective candidates, who would ordinarily 
have difficulty running for office, can afford to run for office since public financing of 
campaigns helps to level the playing field in campaigns economically (Malhotra 2008, 264; 
Mayer, Werner, and Williams 2006, 245). Without public financing, incumbents running for 
reelection rarely face quality challengers because incumbents are much more able to raise 
substantially more money than most challengers and they are able to do so earlier on in the race 
(Malhotra 2008, 264). This is because incumbents have the ability to “perform constituency 
service…and deliver distributive benefits to their districts” in addition to their ability to raise 
money much more rapidly than a challenger (Malhotra 2008, 268). However, with the 
implementation of full public funding programs, challengers have the ability to receive the same 
amount of money as the incumbent (Malhotra 2008, 264; Mayer, Werner, and Williams 2006, 
245). This presents challengers with a greater chance of unseating an incumbent than they would 
have without public funding (Malhotra 2008, 264) In particular, unless a challenger is willing 
and able to spend a large amount of their own wealth on their campaign, it is difficult for a 
challenger to become a viable candidate without public funding. Additionally, instead of 
receiving large contributions from a few corporations or interest groups, public funding allows 
candidates to receive small donations from the citizens that they would serve if they are elected. 
This creates a relationship between the people and the candidates instead of the corporations or 
interest group and candidates. 
Skeptics argue that public funding for candidates would attract low-quality challengers that 
would ordinarily have difficulties fundraising (Malhotra 2008, 264). However, as Malhotra 
argues, the conditions that must be met in order to receive public funding are successfully able to 
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prevent low-quality challengers from receiving a grant through public funding, which he 
determines to be true in Maine and Arizona (Malhotra 2008, 264). 
Although public funding is typically viewed as beneficial to challengers, it is also beneficial 
to incumbents. With full public funding programs, incumbents can focus more on their position 
in office or campaigning since they do not have to fundraise for their campaigns beyond raising 
qualifying funds. They also can focus more on their constituents instead of listening to their 
campaign donors. In order to fund campaigns, it is typically necessary to accept large campaign 
donations, which often are provided by companies that are seeking access to the politician once 
they are elected (Brifault 1999, 564). Large political donations can create a conflict of interest 
for politicians when an interest group that significantly supported their campaign asks for 
something different than the politician’s constituents (Garrett 2011, 12). This argument is made 
on both the state and national level among those who want to adopt or have already adopted 
public funding programs (Garrett 2011, 12). 
History of Attempts and Successes in the Implementation of Public Funding: 
Although public financing is being implemented more frequently now, it is not a new 
concept in American politics. As Garrett discusses, in 1907, President Theodore Roosevelt made 
the first attempt at proposing a public financing system, which he intended to be used for 
presidential elections, during his State of the Union address (Garrett 2011, 11). It was not until 
1956 that Congress considered using Roosevelt’s idea of public financing for elections (Garrett 
2011, 18). In the wake of a scandal, a bill was introduced to Congress that would provide public 
financing to Congressional candidates on a voluntary basis; however, there was no further action 
after its introduction (Garrett 2011, 18; 19). Senator Neuberger (D-OR), who introduced the bill, 
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feared that without public financing, accepting money could be potentially corrupting and he 
claimed “large private contributions are distasteful for candidates and donors alike” (Garrett 
2011, 20). Opponents of the bill felt that it was overly punitive claiming that supporters of public 
financing “use isolated cases of abuse to make the claim for broad reform” (Garrett 2011, 20). 
Despite criticisms, there were many other attempts to implement public financing of 
Congressional elections after Senator Neuberger’s attempt throughout the 1960s (Garrett 2011, 
20). Although a presidential public financing bill was passed in 1966, it was repealed a year later 
(Garrett 2011, 20). It was not until 1971 that Congress passed the Federal Election Campaign 
Act to replace the Corrupt Practices Act, which was inadequate for dealing with campaign 
finance (Garrett 2011, 21). In the same year, Congress was able to implement voluntary public 
funding for presidential candidates (Garrett 2011, 21).  
Court Decisions that have Impacted Public Funding Laws: 
Since campaign spending laws were first implemented, there have been many court cases 
ruling on the constitutionality of campaign spending laws. Arguably, the most important cases on 
campaign spending is Buckley v. Valeo, which was decided in 1976 (Cornell University Law 
School 2014a). In that case, the constitutionality of several provisions in The Federal Election 
Campaign Act of 1971 was challenged, which all included limitations on contributions and 
spending (Cornell University Law School 2014a). The Supreme Court found that restricting a 
candidate’s campaign spending was a restriction of free speech, which established the precedent 
that spending money was a form of speech (Cornell University Law School 2014a). The court 
also decided that limits on contributions were acceptable (Cornell University Law School 2014a). 
One exception the Supreme Court found in their decision was voluntary restrictions on spending 
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such as a candidate agreeing to limit their spending in order to receive public funding, which is 
the case in Presidential Elections (Cornell University Law School 2014a). 
Since Buckley v. Valeo, there have been many cases on the constitutionality of limiting 
campaign spending and campaign contributions, which have mostly drawn similar findings to 
Buckley v. Valeo (Cornell University Law School 2014a). In particular, the finding that 
restricting spending and contributions is unconstitutional since it restricts freedom of speech has 
become a prominent theme among cases on campaign spending (Cornell University Law School 
2014a). One of these cases was Randell v. Sorrell, which was decided in 2006 (Cornell 
University Law School 2014b). In this case, Vermont’s Act 64, which placed caps on all 
spending and campaign donations, was found to be unconstitutional by the Supreme Court 
(Cornell University Law School 2014b). Vermont’s Act 64 was created as a way to reduce the 
amount of time spent raising money for a campaign and to reduce overall campaign costs, 
however, the court found that Vermont’s caps on spending and contributions was 
unconstitutional because the limits were so low that it would be difficult for a candidate to run a 
proper campaign, which could adversely affect challengers in particular (Cornell University Law 
School 2014b). Additionally, the court found that the spending limit restricted candidates’ first 
amendment right to free speech, in a similar manner to the case of Buckley v. Valeo (Cornell 
University Law School 2014b). 
Another case that prevented restrictions on spending during elections was Davis v. 
Federal Election Commission, which was decided in 2008 (Federal Election Commission 2014). 
In this case, Davis, a candidate for the House of Representatives, believed that his first 
amendment right to free speech was being violated by the “Millionaires’ Amendment.” This 
amendment was part of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 that provided amendments 
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to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971. This act allowed his opponent to have increased 
contribution limits because Davis was spending more than $350,000 of his personal wealth 
(Federal Elections Commission 2014). The Supreme Court found that the “Millionaires’ 
Amendment” was unconstitutional under the First Amendment for similar reasons to those 
provided in Buckley v. Valeo (1976) and Randel v. Sorrell (2006) deciding that it penalized 
candidates who spent their personal wealth for their campaign (Federal Election Commission 
2014). 
Because of these decisions, the only way to restrict spending and contributions is through 
voluntary programs, such as public funding. After states began implement public financing 
programs, cases arose on the constitutionality of public funding. These cases have had a serious 
impact on the ability of public funding programs to provide sufficient funding to candidates for 
their campaigns. 
One of the most recent cases that have impacted public funding is Arizona Free 
Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, which was decided in 2011 (Brennan Center 
for Justice 2011). Arizona provides funds to candidates initially for their campaign and then 
candidates are granted additional funding to match their opponent if their opponent, who has not 
accepted public funding, outspends the amount of money they received initially (Brennan Center 
for Justice 2011). In its decision, the Supreme Court found that it was unconstitutional for 
candidates to receive these matching grants because it infringed on the First Amendment right to 
free speech of the candidate who did not accept public funding without a compelling reason 
(Brennan Center for Justice 2011). This Supreme Court decision has prevents all public funding 
programs “from giving extra money to publicly funded candidates facing privately funded rivals” 
(Davenport 2010). This decision was further applied specifically to Connecticut’s trigger 
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provision in a Second Circuit Court of Appeals Case (Common Cause 2010). Additionally, 
Maine adjusted their public funding by removing their trigger provision after Arizona Free 
Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett was decided. As a result, Connecticut, Arizona, 
and Maine have each made changes to their public financing laws to abide by the Court’s 
decision. 
In Connecticut, Green Party of Connecticut v. Garfield went to the United States Court of 
Appeals. This case, which was decided in 2010, called into question whether Connecticut’s 
public financing law is discriminatory against minor party candidates (Brennan Center for Justice 
2014, 14). The U.S. Court of Appeals decided that they “…cannot conclude, on this record, that 
the statewide eligibility criteria impose an unfair or unnecessary burden on minor-party 
candidates in safe districts” (Brennan Center for Justice 2014, 36). Furthermore, they found that 
“grant amounts and expenditure limits” do not burden the minor party candidates who apply for 
public funding (Brennan Center for Justice 2014, 40). Because the case was overturned, it does 
not have an effect on Connecticut’s public financing laws, although this result could change if it 
reaches the Supreme Court. 
Significance: 
This chapter demonstrates the possible impact that public financing laws can have on an 
election and discusses the cases that have affected the implementation of public funding. The 
literature review on campaign finance provided insight into the relationship between an 
incumbent and challenger, which can help to explain how public financing laws can increase 
competitiveness. Jacobson shows the vicious cycle that exists when a challenger attempts to 
fundraise. In particular, it is difficult for a challenger to gain legitimacy unless they have money 
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to spend and it is difficult to raise money unless they have legitimacy. This makes it very 
difficult for a candidate to run unless they have personal wealth to spend on the campaign or 
unless they have held a previous office so they already have connections to possible contributors. 
When public funding is available to candidates, it lessens this burden of attempting to fundraise 
as a challenger. Additionally, public funding can increase competitiveness in elections and can 
help reduce incumbency advantage because spending benefits the challenger. 
It is also important to remember the history of attempts to create public funding and 
campaign finance laws because it helps to provide background for why the laws in Minnesota, 
Maine, Arizona, and Connecticut were created. For this reason, it is also important to look at 
previous cases involving public funding and campaign finance laws. 
The information in this chapter should provide a better understanding of public funding, 
which should help explain the data analysis in Chapter 4.  
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Chapter 3: Overview of Public Funding in Minnesota, Maine, Arizona, and Connecticut 
Introduction: 
 The purpose of this chapter is to present the existing literature on public funding in 
Minnesota, Maine, Arizona, and Connecticut and analyze the public funding laws of each state. 
First, I will explain the reason for selecting the data that I chose. Second, I will discuss the 
existing literature and the laws of each individual state. Third, I will compare the laws of each 
state. Finally, I will discuss the possible impact of the differences in the laws of each state on the 
analysis that will be provided in Chapter 4. 
How I selected the data: 
The National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) provides a list of all “public funding 
programs” offered in twenty-five states (NCSL 2013). The NCSL website distinguishes the 
different types of state public funding programs that are currently in effect (NCSL 2013). Of the 
twenty-five states with some variation of a public funding program, the NCSL website divides 
the programs into three categories, “those which provide funds directly to individual candidates, 
those that provide funds to political parties, and those which provide tax incentives to citizens 
who make political contributions” (NCSL 2013).  
In deciding which elections to use for my research, I determined that state legislative 
candidates from the House and the Senate would provide the largest data set to analyze, as 
opposed to gubernatorial or judicial elections that have less positions in an election, thus making 
this analysis the most accurate. Additionally, I chose to look at programs that provided full 
public funding for qualifying candidates, since those programs would best show the impact of 
public funding. Of the fourteen states that provide public funds directly to candidates, three states 
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provide full clean election programs to their legislators, which met my criteria (NCSL 2013). 
These clean election programs are designed to take interest group money out of elections by 
providing public funds in place of interest group donations, which makes candidates who are 
elected more responsible to the people and not to interest groups. The states that provide such 
programs are: Connecticut, Maine, and Arizona (NCSL 2013). Additionally, I will compare the 
public funding programs in these states to the public funding program in Minnesota, which was 
the first public funding program to be implemented on the state level (Wattson 2002). 
Minnesota’s public funding program differs immensely from Maine, Arizona, and Connecticut’s 
public funding programs, providing subsidies to qualifying candidates while allowing the 
candidates to spend their own campaign funds, instead of providing qualifying candidates with 
funds and preventing them from spending any other money. Because of the difference between 
Minnesota’s subsidy program and the other states’ full public funding programs, comparing their 
programs through this analysis could determine whether the new laws are more preferable than 
the Minnesota law, which could provide a clearer understand of the impacts of such laws than 
just analyzing the differences between full public funding programs (Wattson 2002). 
Minnesota: 
In 1974, as a response to Watergate, Minnesota took the first step towards cleaner elections 
with the implementation of the “Ethical Practices Act” (Wattson 2002). This act established a 
voluntary subsidy program for candidates (Wattson 2002). In particular, voters could contribute 
five dollars to fund elections on their tax forms with the option of allocating the money to a 
specific party (Donnay and Ramsden, 1995, 352). The money collected was then distributed 
among candidates within the districts that it was collected from proportionately to candidates that 
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chose to participate1 (Donnay and Ramsden, 1995, 353). Since Minnesota found that this system 
disproportionately favored incumbents, as candidates were still allowed to raise money 
independently, the system was revised in 1982 in order to include spending limits for candidates 
(Donnay and Ramsden, 1995, 353). Again, the system seemed to favor incumbents because an 
incumbent generally has the advantage of name recognition over a challenger and because 
spending limits made it more difficult for challengers to increase their name recognition 
(Panagopoulos 2011, 208). In 1993, as a result of the ineffectiveness of their public funding 
system, Minnesota’s “Governor Carlson insisted on supplementing the general account with a 
permanent appropriation from the general fund” in the amount of $1.5 million for each 
subsequent election, which was passed through their legislative process (Wattson 2002). 
Under the current system, House candidates must raise $1,500 and Senate candidates must 
raise $3,000 in qualifying contributions in order to be considered a “viable” candidate for public 
funding (Wattson 2002). Additionally, they must agree to limit their spending to the amount 
specified by the law (Wattson 2002). Currently, this limits campaign spending to $30,000 for 
Senate candidates and $60,000 for House candidates (Minnesota Campaign Finance and Public 
Disclosure Board, hereafter as MCFPDB 2013a, 25). First time candidates for an office are 
allowed to spend 10% more on their campaign than other candidates and candidates that won a 
primary by less than a two percent vote margin can spend 20% more than the base spending limit 
(MCFPDB 2013a, 40). For the 2008 House election cycle, the average subsidy provided was 
24.57% of the average campaign expenditure, similarly, for the 2010 House election cycle they 
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were 26.55% of the average campaign expenditure and for the 2010 Senate election cycle they 
were 35.07% of the average campaign expenditure2 (MCFPDB 2008; MCFPD 2010). 
Donnay and Ramsden conducted an analysis of the public funding system of Minnesota’s 
state House and state Senate (1995,357). By including the years from 1966 to 1990, they were 
able to analyze the system for the ten years before public funding as well as the fourteen years 
after the implementation of public funding (Donnay and Ramsden 1995, 356). They focused 
their analysis on the level of competitiveness after the implementation of public funding 
(Donnay and Ramsden 1995, 355). They found “that the share of the vote received by 
incumbents actually increased” during the first election after the implementation of public 
funding, seeing an increase of .374 percentage points on average among House incumbents and 
an increase of .029 percentage points among Senate incumbents (Donnay and Ramsden 1995, 
355). Additionally, between 1976 and 1990 in the Minnesota House, they found that incumbents 
saw an 8.19 percent increase in vote percentage when both the incumbent and the challenger 
received public funding versus when the House incumbent and challenger did not accept public 
funding (Donnay and Ramsden 1995, 356-357). However, after reaching this conclusion, 
Donnay and Ramsden divided the data into smaller categories to try to better explain the 
reasoning for the results (1995, 359). Additionally, they set controls in the data including: 
“controlling for the variation between challengers and incumbents both in terms of how much 
each takes from the state treasury and how much they spend overall” and controlling for the fact 
that incumbents tend to mirror challengers in spending and accepting public funding, meaning 
that an incumbent will spend more on an election if a challenger begins to spend more and an 
incumbent will be more likely to accept public funding when a challenger does (Donnay and 
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Ramsden 1995, 358). With these controls in place, they found that incumbents who accepted 
public funding saw a decline in the proportion of the vote such that, “when the data for all Senate 
elections between 1976 and 1990 are aggregated, the average Senate incumbent who accepted 
public campaign financing experienced a 6.68% drop in vote share” (Donnay and Ramsden 1995, 
361). Still, they found that in both the Senate and the House, when a challenger accepts public 
funding, the incumbent was advantaged (Donnay and Ramsden 1995, 361). They conclude that 
this advantage is “largely a reflection of a bias in the Minnesota System” towards incumbents 
because typically incumbents benefit from name recognition so they do not need as much 
funding to be recognized, unlike a challenger (Donnay and Ramsden 1995, 361). In their data, 
they found that an increase in spending by a challenger led to a higher vote percentage for the 
challenger (Donnay and Ramsden 1995, 362). Therefore, although they initially thought that the 
system favored the incumbent, they concluded that any increase in public funding helped the 
challenger so that, if the system was improved so that the funding provided to challengers was 
greater, public funding could help facilitate more competitive elections (Donnay and Ramsden 
1995, 362). 
Since this article by Donnay and Ramsden was published, it appears that Minnesota has 
made an effort to better aid the challenger in their campaign when they take advantage of public 
funding. With the implementation of the new rule that allows candidates who are running for an 
office for the first time to spend ten percent more than the base limit on candidate spending, there 
would appear to be more of an advantage for the challenger in districts where both the incumbent 
and the challenger accept public funding than in their previous system (MCFPDB 2013a, 40). 
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Arizona: 
In 2000, Arizona’s “Citizen’s Clean Elections Act” went into effect (NCSL 2007). House 
and Senate Candidates have the same criteria when applying for public funding (NCSL 2007). In 
order for a House or Senate candidate to qualify for public funding in Arizona, a candidate 
would have to raise $220 in $5 donations with their “seed money” which may total up to $2,500 
(NCSL 2007; Malhotra 2008, 267). Once a legislative candidate has qualified and signed an 
agreement to follow the restrictions of the public financing law, which primarily restricts 
candidates from receiving money from outside sources for their campaign during the election 
cycle, they are given their initial disbursement of $10,000 for primary elections and $15,000 for 
general elections, which is adjusted biennially3 (Malhotra 2008, 267). If necessary, during the 
general election, candidates may receive additional money of up to $75,000 if they are in a 
competitive election (Malhotra 2008, 267). This, however, has been changed due to the 2010 
Supreme Court decision, Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, which 
prevents Arizona “from giving extra money to publicly funded candidates facing privately 
funded rivals” (Davenport 2010). This decision could affect the number of candidates who 
accept public funding in future elections, since they could potentially receive much less money 
than their opponent spends, which would give them a distinct disadvantage that could 
disincentivize them from accepting public funding. Additionally, it could affect the 
competitiveness of elections between a candidate who accepts public funding and a candidate 
who does not because the candidate who does not accept public funding could easily outspend 
the candidate who accepts public funding. 
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Malhotra studied the effects of public funding in Arizona, comparing the competitiveness 
of state Senate elections before and after the implementation of public funding (2008, 265). By 
using the 1992-2000 elections for his analysis, he compared the 1992-1998 elections, which took 
place before public funding, with the 2000 election cycle, which was the first year after their 
public funding law went into effect (Malhotra 2008, 265). Before public funding, he found that 
races with an incumbent running were significantly less competitive than open-seat elections, 
finding that “the presence of an incumbent decreases the number of effective candidates by 
about .30 and expands the margin of victory by over 20 percentage points” (Malhotra 2008, 273). 
This is because an incumbent typically has an advantage over a challenger since they have the 
advantage of name recognition and they usually have a greater ability to raise money for their 
campaigns. When looking at the 2000 data, Malhotra found that while public funding did not 
significantly affect the competitiveness of the Senate races as a whole for the 2000 election cycle, 
public funding had a significant effect on the competitiveness of races in which public funding 
was involved (Malhotra 2008, 273). Specifically, he found that effects of public funding are 
greater in elections with an incumbent running than they are in open seat races because, without 
public funding, incumbents generally have name recognition which gives them an advantage, 
while open seat races are generally more competitive because both candidates have a more equal 
chance so adding public funding has the ability to change elections with incumbents more 
(Malhotra 2008, 274). This is also because the challenger was able to receive funding that 
matched the amount of money the incumbent spent, narrowing the incumbent advantage 
(Malhotra 2008, 274). Additionally, he found that clean election laws are “effective tools of 
enhancing competition, but their impact is not all-powerful and depends on the characteristics of 
individual contestants” (Malhotra 2008, 277). He concludes that public financing in Arizona 
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most substantially affects the electoral competition when a challenger elects to use the system 
(Malhotra 2008, 274). This follows Jacobson’s conclusion, since there is an increase in spending 
for the challenger early on in the race for challengers who elect to use public funding. 
Maine: 
Maine’s “Clean Election Act” went into effect in 2000 (Malhotra 2008, 265). Currently, 
Maine’s legislative candidates who choose to use public funding, can receive up to $100 per 
individual contributor, totaling $500 for House candidates and $1,500 for Senate candidates, as 
seed money towards an election (MCEA 2013). Additionally, candidates are unable to receive 
money from lobbyists or their clients (MCEA 2013). Between January 1 and April 20, House 
candidates must receive 60 qualifying contributions and Senate candidates must receive 175 
qualifying contributions, each of $5 of more (MCEA 2013). Then candidates sign a declaration 
of intent, which states that they “…understand that it is [their] responsibility to review and to 
comply with the Maine Election Law, and the Commission’s rules and policies” (Maine 
Declaration of Intent 2010). The law also requires greater transparency by requiring any 
contribution of more than $50 must be reported (MCEA 2013). In 2008, the average amount of 
public funding given to legislative candidates was $10,326.334 (MCEA 2009). 
As with Arizona, Malhotra discusses Maine’s public funding system in “The Impact of 
Public Financing on Electoral Competition: Evidence from Arizona and Maine”, in which he 
conducts an analysis of the competitiveness of elections in Maine, comparing the level of 
competitiveness in the state Senate before and after the implementation of Maine’s “Clean 
Election Act” in 2000 (Malhotra 2008, 265). By using the 1994-2002 election cycles for Maine, 
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Malhotra compared the 1994-1998 election cycles, which were before the implementation of 
their public funding law, to the 2000 and 2002 election cycles, which were after the 
implementation of public funding (Malhotra 2008, 265). Malhotra states that the analyses of the 
Maine Senate “nearly parallel findings to the Arizona Senate” in that “public financing did not 
enhance competition across all districts” but it did in races in which the challenger accepted 
public funding (Malhotra 2008, 275). Specifically, before the Clean Election Act, he found that 
incumbency and competitiveness had a negative relationship such that the presence of an 
incumbent decreases competition (Malhotra 2008, 275). However, he found that this correlation 
is less significant than it was in Arizona such that the presence of an incumbent decreased the 
number of effective candidates by about .15 and expanded the margin of victory by .14 
(Malhotra 2008, 276-277). Malhotra hypothesizes that the reason for the difference between 
Maine and Arizona’s correlation between incumbency and competitiveness is that Maine has a 
less professional legislature so elections are not as competitive and that the districts in Arizona 
are much larger, making an increase in campaign spending more significant than in Maine’s 
smaller districts (Malhotra 2008, 275-276). 
Connecticut: 
Connecticut’s clean election program, called the “Citizens’ Election Program”, was first 
implemented in 2008 in the wake of corruption scandals involving their ex-Governor John 
Rowland (Malhotra 2008, 278). One of the biggest factors that can lead to corruption is a 
candidate who accepts political contributions and gifts from corporations that conducted business 
with the state. In an effort to prevent future corruption, the public financing legislation was 
passed by the legislature. 
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In order for state Senate candidates to receive public funding, they first have to raise $1,500 
from at least 300 individuals with contributions ranging from $5 to $100 and then they have to 
agree to forego outside contributions after receiving public funding5 (Citizens’ Election Program 
2013; NCSL 2007). Candidates are approved for different sums of money depending on the race 
(Citizens’ Election Program 2013, 14). For example, unopposed candidates receive a smaller 
grant than opposed candidates (Citizens’ Election Program 2013, 9). Additionally, in a party-
dominant district, in which enrollment in one party exceeds enrollment in another party by at 
least twenty percent, candidates are eligible for larger grants in primary campaigns because the 
primary election is usually a more competitive race (Citizens’ Election Program 2013, 8). For 
general election candidates with a major party opponent, the state Senate candidates received 
$88,400 and the state House candidates received $26,000 (State Elections Enforcement 
Commission 2010, 5). As in the case of Arizona, Connecticut legislative candidates that accept 
public funding will no longer be able to receive “extra funds based on their opponents' spending”, 
which could hinder their ability to campaign if they accept public funds (Shesgreen 2011). This 
decision was further applied specifically to Connecticut’s trigger provision in a Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals Case (Common Cause 2010).  
According to the Citizens’ Election Program, the goal of public funding in Connecticut is to 
promote “clean” elections (CEP 2013, 1). They claim that their program allows candidates to 
“compete without reliance on special interest money”, which ensures that they are free from 
influence by interest groups (CEP 2013, 1). In turn, this program helps to restore “public 
confidence in the electoral and legislative process” (Casey 2012, 1). This program also helps to 
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increase citizen participation and to provide the public with better information on campaign 
finance (Casey 2012, 1). 
Comparison of Public Funding Programs: 
Arizona, Maine, and Connecticut have very similar public funding programs in place. 
Each of these states has full public funding programs as opposed to a subsidy program, like 
Minnesota. In Arizona, Maine, and Connecticut, candidates raise qualifying contributions and 
sign an agreement that they will not receive any additional outside contributions. Then 
candidates receive an initial amount of funding, which could be increased based on the 
competitiveness of the race in elections prior to the Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom 
Club PAC v. Bennett decision in 2011. Additionally, because Arizona, Maine, and Connecticut 
all wrote their legislation within a decade of each other, it is expected that they would be similar 
to one another. 
On the other hand, Minnesota’s public financing program differs from the programs in 
Arizona, Maine, and Connecticut. Since Minnesota’s system was introduced in 1976 and was the 
first state public funding system, it has been more of a process of “trial and error” while evolving 
into its current state. Like the other states with public funding programs, Minnesota requires its 
candidates to raise qualifying contributions. Additionally, Minnesota’s public funding program 
requires candidates, who accept their subsidies, to sign an agreement to abide by the terms of the 
public funding program, which includes a spending limitation. However, Minnesota election 
laws differ from the other states with public funding since the law allows first-time candidates 
and candidates who won their primaries by small margins, to spend more money than other 
candidates. Additionally, the Minnesota election laws allow candidates to continue to raise and 
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spend their own money in addition to public funding, so long as they stay within their total 
spending limits. Finally, while Minnesota’s program is primarily a subsidy program, where 
candidates are still expected to raise their own money, the other states’ programs are clean 
elections programs, which prohibit candidates from accepting outside contributions. 
Significance: 
 The information on the public funding programs of each state provides insight that will 
be important for a proper analysis of the effectiveness of the public funding programs. Since 
each program differs in some ways from one another, these differences could have an impact on 
the findings. For example, as Malhotra noted, competitiveness in Maine and Arizona differed 
because the larger district size in Arizona made an increase in funding more significant, therefore 
making Arizona more competitive (2008, 275-276). I expect that these differences will be even 
more apparent when I compare Maine, Arizona, and Connecticut with Minnesota. My hypothesis 
is that Maine, Arizona, and Connecticut will have similar findings when the competitiveness of 
elections with public funding are compared to elections without public funding while I expect to 
find Minnesota’s competitiveness to be lower than the other states. One aspect of Minnesota’s 
effectiveness in creating competitive election could be the amount that they provide in subsidies, 
if they do not provide enough, it could be difficult for a challenger to run a successful campaign. 
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Chapter 4: Data Analysis 
Introduction: 
In this chapter, I will discuss my data collection method, present my findings, and 
provide a data analysis. The purpose of this chapter is to use election results from Maine, 
Arizona, Connecticut, and Minnesota to answer my research questions, which are: “Among the 
states that provide full public funding for their legislative candidates, which state is most 
successfully able to provide public funding programs that incentivize their state legislative 
candidates to accept the limitations of their public financing laws?” and “Which state has the 
most competitive elections among major party legislative candidates who accept public funding 
for their campaigns?” 
How Data was Selected: 
 In order to determine which variables would be useful in answering my research 
questions, I first determined which elections to use for my analysis. I determined that 2008 and 
2010 would be the best years to use in order to compare results since Connecticut’s public 
funding system was first used in a regular legislative election in 2008. Additionally, using 2008 
and 2010 provides one presidential election, 2008, and one nonpresidential election, 2010, which 
can lower the effect of the national tides on the data.  
Next, I narrowed my research to look at the vote margin of major party candidates. I 
decided to collect the vote count of the Democrat and the Republican, leaving out the minor 
party vote, which I then calculated as a percentage by dividing the candidates’ individual vote 
total by the sum of the Democrat and the Republicans vote totals. Then, I subtracted each of 
those percentages to determine vote margin, in order to determine the possibility of an increase 
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in competitiveness when public funding is used. I also collected data on major party candidates 
who accepted public funding. I then divided each states’ data into three groups: both major party 
candidates accepted public funding, one major party candidate accepted public funding, and 
neither major party candidate accepted public funding. I did not look at districts with only one 
major party candidate since those districts would not provide insight into the effect of public 
funding on competitiveness. I was then able to calculate the mean of the vote margin for each 
group for each state. This would help to show whether elections are more competitive in districts 
where both major party candidates accept funding, compared to districts where one or neither 
candidate accepts public funding. Additionally, this calculation can be used to compare each 
state’s program. 
 I also collected data on the number of major party candidates in each state that accepted 
public funding and divided that number by the total number of major party candidates that ran in 
each state to find the percentage of major party candidates that used public funding in each 
state’s legislative elections. This data can help determine how successfully a state is able to 
incentivize candidates to use their public funding systems, since an unsuccessful program is 
unlikely to attract candidates to apply for funding. 
Data Used for the Analysis: 
In order to answer my research questions, I assembled data from several sources. Below, 
I explain which sources were used for each portion of data; however, the full citation for each of 
these sources is listed in the bibliography. 
For Minnesota, I used the “November 4, 2008 General Election Results” and the 
“November 2, 2010 General Election Results” found on the Minnesota Secretary of State’s 
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website for data on actual election results and I used the data on which candidates accepted 
subsidies provided by the Minnesota Campaign Finance and Public Disclosure Board in their 
“2007/2008 Campaign Finance Summary” and “2009/2010 Campaign Finance Summary” 
reports (Minnesota Secretary of State’s Office 2008; Minnesota Secretary of State’s Office 2010; 
MCFPDB 2007; MCFPDB 2009). 
 Similarly, I collected Maine’s election results from Maine’s Department of the Secretary 
of State on their “Election Results” page, and their data on which candidates accepted public 
funding from the “Candidate List” on Maine’s Commission on Governmental Ethics and 
Election Practices website (Department of the Secretary of State of Maine 2014; Maine 
Commission on Governmental Ethics and Election Practices 2014).  
I similarly found Arizona’s election results in “2008 General Election Results” and 
“November 2, 2010 General Election”, found on their Secretary of State’s website (Arizona 
Secretary of State’s Office 2008; Arizona Secretary of State’s Office 2009). Then I found data on 
which candidates accepted public funding on the Arizona Citizens’ Clean Elections Commission 
website under “All Candidate- Primary Election” (Arizona Citizens’ Clean Elections 
Commission 2014a). 
For Connecticut, I found the election results at their Secretary of State’s website under 
“Election Results” and the Connecticut Elections Enforcement Commission had a compilation of 
candidates who accepted public funding on their “List of Participating and Nonparticipating 
Candidates” (Connecticut Secretary of State 2014; Connecticut Elections Enforcement 
Commission 2014). 
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Limitations in Data: 
I found some difficulties while compiling the data. In particular, since there was a low 
number of districts in each state in which neither candidate accepted funding, it was difficult to 
accurately determine whether public funding increased competitiveness, although it could 
possibly indicate their program’s successfulness, since they are able to incentivize such a large 
portion of candidates to accept public funding. 
Another limitation in my data is that Arizona’s State House has multimember districts, 
which makes it impossible to take the vote margin. As a result, data from Arizona that was used 
to show competitiveness was only taken from Senate races, although the House data on the 
number of Arizona candidates that accepted funding could still be used to show the percentage of 
candidates that accepted public funding. 
Data Analysis: 
For the first portion of my research question, in order to measure the ability for public 
funding to incentivize state legislative candidates to accept the limitations of their public 
financing laws, I compared the percentage of candidates who accept public funding in each state, 
which can be found it Tables 1 through 5. My hypothesis was that Maine, Connecticut, and 
Arizona would have similar success in their ability to incentivize candidates to accept public 
funding programs while Minnesota would be less able to incentivize candidates. 
Table 1, below, displays the number of candidates who accepted public funding in each 
race and shows the percentage of candidates who accepted by race and in total for Minnesota. To 
find the “number of candidates who accepted public funding” I added the number of Republican 
and Democratic candidates from each district who accepted public funding for the general 
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election. For the “total number of candidates” I added the number of Republican and Democrats 
from each district in the general election. To find the “number of candidates who did not accept 
public funding”, I subtracted the “number of candidates who accepted public funding” from the 
“total number of candidates”. Finally, I calculated the “percentage of candidates who accepted 
funding” by dividing the “number of candidates who accepted public funding” by the “total 
number of candidates”. As Minnesota did not have a Senate race in 2008, there was not data for 
that race. 
Table 1: Minnesota Major Party Legislative Candidates who Accepted Public Funding by Election Year 
 
2008 House 2010 House 2010 Senate Total 
Number of Candidates who accepted Public 
Funding 
261 239 120 620 
Number of Candidates who did not accept Public 
Funding 
7 29 12 48 
Total Number of Candidates 268 268 132 668 
Percentage of Candidates who accepted funding 97.39% 89.18% 90.91% 92.81% 
 
From this data, it appears that 2008 had significantly more candidates who accepted 
funding, especially when looking at the difference between the 2008 House and 2010 House data 
in which there was a decrease of more than eight percent. 
Maine’s data in table 2, below, is similar to table 1 in how I calculated each variable on 
major party legislative candidates who accepted public funding by election year, using the data 
from Maine’s legislature. 
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Table 2: Maine Major Party Legislative Candidates who Accepted Public Funding by Election Year 
 
2008 House 2008 Senate 2010 House 2010 Senate Total 
Number of Candidates who 
accepted Public Funding 
233 53 231 60 577 
Number of Candidates who 
did not accept Public Funding 
47 17 61 9 134 
Total Number of Candidates 280 70 292 69 711 
Percentage of Candidates who 
accepted funding 
83.21% 75.71% 79.11% 86.96% 81.15% 
 
The percentage of candidates who accepted pubic funding is lower on average in Maine 
than it is Minnesota for each legislature and year as well as for the total percentage. It does not 
seem like there is any pattern between the two election years. 
Table 3 below is similar to Tables 1 and 2 in how I calculated each variable, except that I 
used the data from Arizona’s legislature. 
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Table 3: Arizona Major Party Legislative Candidates who Accepted Public Funding by Election Year 
 
2008 House 2008 Senate 2010 House 2010 Senate Total 
Number of Candidates who 
accepted Public Funding 
69 41 51 24 185 
Number of Candidates who did 
not accept Public Funding 
29 11 40 26 106 
Total Number of Candidates 98 52 91 50 291 
Percentage of Candidates who 
accepted funding 
70.41% 78.85% 56.04% 48% 63.57% 
 
This table shows that there is a significant drop in the number of candidates who accepted 
public funding in Arizona between the 2008 elections and the 2010 elections. This decrease is 
most likely because of the Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett case, 
which was being decided by the Supreme Court during the 2010 election cycle. This case was 
determining whether candidates could be provided with additional public funds after their first 
initial grant, making candidates more hesitant to limit themselves by using funding. Additionally, 
fewer candidates accepted funding in Arizona overall than in Minnesota and Maine.  
The data in Table 4 was also calculated in the same manner as the data in Tables 1, 2, and 
3 with the data from Connecticut’s legislature. 
 
 
  Lauer 44 
Table 4: Connecticut Major Party Legislative Candidates who Accepted Public Funding by Election 
Year 
 
2008 House 2008 Senate 2010 House 2010 Senate Total 
Number of Candidates who 
accepted Public Funding 
184 49 187 43 463 
Number of Candidates who did 
not accept Public Funding 
55 14 75 22 166 
Total Number of Candidates 239 63 262 65 629 
Percentage of Candidates who 
accepted funding 
76.99% 77.78% 71.37% 66.15% 73.61% 
 
As in the case of Arizona, Connecticut faced a decline in their percentage of candidates 
who accepted public funding. This is most likely also because of the Supreme Court’s decision 
on Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett. Overall, however, there was a 
smaller decline than there was in Arizona. Additionally, a higher percentage of candidates 
accepted public funding in Connecticut than in Arizona, although it is lower overall than 
Minnesota and Maine. 
 Table 5, below, is a compilation of the total percentage of candidates that accepted public 
funding from each state from the data in tables 1 through 4, which better illustrates the 
comparison of public funding acceptance for each state. 
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Table 5: Total Percentage of Candidates who Accepted Public Funding by State 
 Arizona Connecticut Maine Minnesota 
Percentage of Candidates who Accepted 
Public Funding 
63.57% 73.61% 81.15% 92.81% 
 
Since Minnesota has a different program from the other three states that I looked at, it is 
interesting to see the difference in the percentage of candidates who received subsidies. Overall, 
Minnesota’s program attracts significantly more candidates than any of the other states, despite 
that fact that districts in which candidates accept public funding have a much wider vote margin 
than districts in which a candidate does not. 
To provide a further understanding of who accepted public funding, I looked at 
unopposed major party candidates to determine whether or not they accept funding. For table 6, 
In order to find the number of unopposed major party candidates who accepted public funding, I 
found the variable “unopposed candidate accepted public funds” by counting the number of 
unopposed candidates who accepted funds. I then counted the number of unopposed districts 
overall for the “total unopposed races” variable. I then divided “unopposed candidate accepted 
public funds” by “total unopposed races”. 
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Table 6: Minnesota Unopposed Candidates Accepting Funding by Election Year 
 
2008 House 2010 House 2010 Senate Total 
Unopposed candidate accepted public funds 0 4 2 6 
Total Unopposed races 0 4 2 6 
Percentage of unopposed candidates who 
accepted public funds 
Not 
Applicable 
100% 100% 100% 
 
I was surprised that there were no unopposed candidates for the 2008 House races. I was 
also surprised that every unopposed major party legislative candidate in 2008 and 2010 accepted 
funds. 
For Table 7, I calculated the percentage of unopposed candidates that accepted public 
funding in Maine by using the same method that I used for the Minnesota data in Table 8. 
Table 7: Maine Unopposed Candidates Accepting Funding by Election Year 
 
2008 House 2008 Senate 2010 House 2010 Senate Total 
Unopposed candidate accepted 
public funds 
18 0 9 1 28 
Total Unopposed races  22 0 10 1 33 
Percentage of unopposed candidates 
who accepted public funds 
81.82% 
Not 
Applicable 
90% 100% 84.85% 
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The number of unopposed candidates that accepted public funds in Maine was higher 
than I expected, although not as high as it was in Minnesota. Overall, the data is consistent with 
the total percentage of candidates who received public funds overall for Maine. I was also 
surprised with how few unopposed candidates there were in the Senate for 2008 and 2010. 
For table 8, I used the same method that I used for the Minnesota and Maine data in 
Tables 6 and 7 to calculate Arizona’s data on unopposed major party candidates who accepted 
public funding. 
 
Compared to Minnesota and Maine, the percentage of unopposed major party candidates 
who accepted public funding was much lower, however, the data is somewhat limited because 
the House races are structured in a way that did not provide any unopposed races. However, after 
seeing the high rate at which unopposed candidates accepted funding in Minnesota and Maine, 
Arizona’s 16.67% is drastically lower. This could be because unopposed candidates did not find 
it worth the trouble to apply for public funding in Arizona since unopposed candidates can only 
Table 8: Arizona Unopposed Candidates Accepting Funding by Election Year 
 
2008 House 2008 Senate 2010 House 2010 Senate Total 
Unopposed candidate accepted 
public funds 
0 1 0 2 3 
Total Unopposed races 0 8 0 10 18 
Percentage of unopposed candidates 
who accepted public funds 
Not 
Applicable 
12.5% 
Not 
Applicable 
20% 16.67% 
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receive five times the amount of money they raised in qualifying contributions (Arizona Citizens’ 
Clean Elections Commission. 2014b, 29). 
Table 9 also has the same method for collecting data on unopposed major party 
candidates who accepted public funding as Minnesota, Maine, and Arizona in Tables 6, 7, and 8, 
using the Connecticut data. 
Table 9: Connecticut Unopposed Candidates Accepting Funding by Election Year 
 
2008 House 2008 Senate 2010 House 2010 Senate Total 
Unopposed candidate accepted public funds 30 6 12 1 49 
Total Unopposed races  63 9 40 7 119 
Percentage of unopposed candidates who 
accepted public funds 
47.62% 66.67% 30% 14.29% 41.18% 
 
There does not seem to be any type of pattern in the percentage of unopposed candidates 
who accepted funding in Connecticut other than the fact that there is a decrease in the number of 
unopposed candidates who accepted funding in 2010 when compared to 2008. Connecticut’s 
unopposed legislative candidates were overall about half as likely to accept public funding than 
they were in Maine but were twice as likely to accept funding as compared with Arizona. 
Next, I compiled data in order to determine what percent of districts for each state and 
year had neither major party candidate accept public funding, one major party candidate accept 
public funding, and both major party candidates accept public funding in races with two major 
party candidates, which is provided in tables 10 through 14. This data can help to show which 
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type of race typically occurs, which can help to show each states’ ability to incentive candidates 
to accept their public funding program. 
Table 10, below, shows the types of elections with public funding in Minnesota for each 
election year. When calculating this data, I only used races with a Democratic and Republican 
candidate and I only looked at whether the candidates accepted public funding for the general 
election, meaning that, if they accepted funding for their primary but not for the general election, 
then I counted them as not accepting. The first row, “both major party candidates accepted”, 
shows the district total and the percentage of races for each election where both major party 
candidates accepted public funding. The percentage was calculated by adding the total number of 
districts that had both their major party candidates accept funding and divided by the total 
number of races with two major party candidates for that particular election. “One Major Party 
Candidate Accepted” was calculated in a similar manner but with races where only one of the 
two major party candidates accepted public funding. “Neither major party candidate accepted” 
was also calculated in the same way but with races where neither the Democrat or the 
Republican accepted public funds. 
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Table 10: Minnesota’s Types of Election with Funding by Election Year 
 
2008 House 2010 House 2010 Senate Total 
Both Major Party 
Candidates Accepted 
Districts Total 128 110 52 290 
Percent 96% 85% 80% 88% 
One Major Party 
Candidate Accepted 
Districts Total  5 15 13 33 
Percent 4% 12% 20% 10% 
Neither Major Party 
Candidate Accepted 
Districts Total 1 5 0 6 
Percent 1% 4% 0% 2% 
Total Number of Competitive Races 134 130 65 329 
 
Minnesota’s percentage of races where both candidates accepted funding seemed very 
high to me considering that Donnay and Ramsden said that Minnesota’s program generally 
favors the incumbent. Although it would appear that facing an incumbent would deter the 
challenger from using public funding, in just ten percent of the races only one major party 
candidate accepted funding.  
In calculating the data for Table 11, I used the same method that I used in calculating 
Minnesota’s data in Table 10. 
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Table 11: Maine’s Types of Election with Funding by Election Year 
 
2008 House 2008 Senate 2010 House 2010 Senate Total 
Both Major Party 
Candidates Accepted 
Districts Total 86 21 86 27 220 
Percent 67% 60% 61% 82% 65% 
One Major Party 
Candidate Accepted 
Districts Total  42 11 48 4 105 
Percent 33% 31% 34% 12% 31% 
Neither Major Party 
Candidate Accepted 
Districts Total 1 3 7 2 13 
Percent 1% 9% 5% 6% 4% 
Total Number of Competitive Races 129 35 141 33 338 
 
Maine’s percentage with both major party candidates accepting public funding was 
smaller than it was in Minnesota by 23 percent. There was also a higher percentage of districts 
where one candidate accepted public funding overall compared with Minnesota. 
 For table 12, I calculated Arizona’s data using the same method I used to calculate table 
10 with Minnesota’s data and Table 11 with Maine’s data. 
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Table 12: Arizona’s Types of Election with Funding by Election Year 
 
2008 Senate 2010 Senate Total 
Both Major Party 
Candidates Accepted 
Districts Total 10 3 13 
Percent 50% 15% 32.5% 
One Major Party 
Candidate Accepted 
Districts Total  8 14 22 
Percent 40% 70% 55% 
Neither Major Party 
Candidate Accepted 
Districts Total 2 3 5 
Percent 10% 15% 12.5% 
Total Number of Competitive Races 20 20 40 
 
In Arizona’s 2008 and 2010 legislative elections, even though there was a significantly 
lower percentage of districts where both candidates accepted public funding than there was in 
Minnesota and Maine, there was a higher percentage of districts where one major party candidate 
accepted public funding. Additionally, there is a decline in the percentage of districts where two 
candidates accept public funding while there is an increase in districts where only one candidate 
accepts public funding between the two elections. This change could have been explained by the 
effect of the Supreme Court decision on Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC v. 
Bennett because candidates, especially challengers, might have been wary of the fact that the 
other candidate could decide not to accept funding and be able to outspend them substantially. 
Although the case was still being decided by the Supreme Court, the provision that allows for 
matching grants was deemed unconstitutional in early 2010, before the elections. 
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Table 13, below, shows the types of elections with funding in Connecticut for each 
election year using the same method used in Tables 10, 11, and 12 with the data for each other 
state. 
Table 13: Connecticut’s Types of Election with Funding by Election Year 
 2008 House 2008 Senate 2010 House 2010 Senate Total 
Both Major Party 
Candidates Accepted 
Districts Total 69 17 72 15 173 
Percent 78% 63% 65% 52% 68% 
One Major Party 
Candidate Accepted 
Districts Total  16 9 30 13 68 
Percent 18% 33% 27% 45% 27% 
Neither Major Party 
Candidate Accepted 
Districts Total 3 1 8 1 13 
Percent 3% 4% 7% 3% 5% 
Total Number of Competitive Races 88 27 110 29 254 
 
Connecticut has a slightly higher average for the total percentage of districts where both 
major party candidates accepted public funding than Maine and Arizona, although it is still 
substantially lower than Minnesota’s average. Additionally, Connecticut’s percentage of 
competitive races where one major party candidate accepted funding is lower than Maine and 
Arizona but higher than Minnesota. There does seem to be a slight decline in the percentage of 
candidates that districts where both major party candidates received public funding while there is 
an increase in the percentage of districts where one major party candidate accepted public 
funding, although there is not as drastic as a change as there was for the Arizona data. 
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Table 14, below, is the compilation of the totals for each state from tables 10, 11, 12, and 
13 to better illustrate the differences between states. 
Table 14: Compilation of Total Types of Election with Funding by State 
 Minnesota Maine Arizona Connecticut 
Both Major Party 
Candidates Accepted 
Districts Total 290 220 13 173 
Percent 88% 65% 32.5% 68% 
One Major Party 
Candidate Accepted 
Districts Total  33 105 22 68 
Percent 10% 31% 55% 27% 
Neither Major Party 
Candidate Accepted 
Districts Total 6 13 5 13 
Percent 2% 4% 12.5% 5% 
Total Number of Competitive Races 329 338 40 254 
 
This table makes it clear that Minnesota had the highest percentage of competitive 
districts in which both major party candidates accepted public funding. Additionally, it shows 
that Arizona had the highest percentage of districts where there was one major party candidate 
and where neither candidate accepted public funding. 
For my second research question, I hypothesized that the state that would have the most 
competitive elections among major party legislative candidates who accept public funding for 
their campaigns would be Arizona then Connecticut and Maine, since Connecticut and Maine 
have smaller districts, which Malhotra determined was a reason that Arizona was more 
competitive than Maine when public funding was used. Additionally, I hypothesized that 
Minnesota would have the least competitive elections, because Minnesota’s subsidy program 
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would provide the least success compared with the other states’ full public funding programs, 
since it was much more limited than the other three programs. In order to answer my second 
research question, I compiled data that is found in tables 15 through 19. 
In Table 15, I calculated the average vote margin for each election, for Minnesota, 
dividing the data into three groups: neither candidate accepted public funding, one candidate 
accepted public funding, and both candidates accepted public funding. I calculated the margin by 
taking the average of the absolute value of the difference between the Republican candidates’ 
percentage of the vote when calculated without minor party candidates and the Democratic 
candidates’ percentage of the vote for each election and type of race. 
Table 15: Minnesota’s Vote Margin by Acceptance of Public Funding in Districts by Election 
 
2008 House 2010 House 2010 Senate Total 
Neither Candidate Accepted Public Funding 31.45% 11.58% Not Applicable 14.89% 
One Candidate Accepted Public Funding 45.77% 32.05% 22.80% 30.49% 
Both Candidates Accepted Public Funding 24.78% 23.43% 20.58% 23.51% 
Average Vote Margin 25.62% 23.97% 21.02% 24.05% 
 
It seems from this data that Minnesota consistently had the most competitive elections 
when neither candidate accepts public funding. Additionally, elections were least competitive 
when only one candidate accepted public funding. This could be because many of the candidates 
who accepted subsidies were incumbents so that accepting subsidies in addition to their typical 
incumbency advantage provided them with a further advantage. 
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Table 16 uses Maine’s data with the same method provided in table 15 with the 
Minnesota data. 
Table 16: Maine’s Vote Margin by Acceptance of Public Funding in Districts by Election 
 
2008 House 2008 Senate 2010 House 2010 Senate Total 
Neither Candidate 
Accepted Public Funding 52.59% 38.40% 29.33% 38.80% 34.67% 
One Candidate Accepted 
Public Funding 21.27% 26.90% 26.24% 26.69% 24.38% 
Both Candidates 
Accepted Public Funding 20.98% 15.64% 17.57% 16.31% 18.56% 
Average Vote Margin 21.32% 21.13% 21.11% 19.37% 21.01% 
 
In Maine, there was a consistent decrease in the vote margin as more candidates accepted 
public funding. This indicates that their elections became more competitive as more candidates 
accepted public funding. 
Table 17 uses the same method used in tables 15 and 16 to calculate vote margin by 
acceptance of public funding for the Arizona elections. Since the Arizona House had 
multimember districts, its data was not used for these calculations. 
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Table 17: Arizona’s Vote Margin by Acceptance of Public Funding in Districts by Election 
 
2008 Senate 2010 Senate Total 
Neither Candidate Accepted Public Funding 38.50% 20.89% 29.70% 
One Candidate Accepted Public Funding 26.76% 26.10% 26.36% 
Both Candidates Accepted Public Funding 18.20% 10.96% 16.53% 
Average Vote Margin 24.47% 23.05% 23.79% 
 
Arizona, like Maine, saw an increase in competitiveness as more candidates ran using 
public funding, except in 2010, where elections where less competitive when one candidate 
accepted funding. However, in both election years there was a significant increase in 
competitiveness between elections where neither major party candidate accepted compared and 
elections where both major party candidates accepted. It seems that there is a greater difference 
between each type of election than there was in Maine. 
Table 18 shows Connecticut’s vote margin by acceptance of public funding using the 
same method that was used to calculate tables 15, 16, and 17. 
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Table 18: Connecticut’s Vote Margin by Acceptance of Public Funding in Districts by Election 
 
2008 House 2008 Senate 2010 House 2010 Senate Total 
Neither Candidate 
Accepted Public Funding 55.22% 18.99% 34.29% 64.92% 42.06% 
One Candidate Accepted 
Public Funding 54.66% 51.24% 30.27% 29.84% 38.71% 
Both Candidates Accepted 
Public Funding 22.70% 20.90% 17.20% 13.18% 19.41% 
Average Vote Margin 29.62% 30.94% 22.08% 23.64% 25.80% 
 
Connecticut, like Maine and Arizona, has an increase in competitiveness as more 
candidates accept public funding with the exception of the 2008 Senate race. There does seem to 
be a smaller increase between districts where neither candidate accepted public funding and 
districts where one candidate accepted public funding in the Senate races and the races actually 
become less competitive in the 2008 Senate race when one candidate accepts funding. 
Table 19, below, is a compilation of tables 15, 16, 17, and 18, showing the mean 
percentage margin of the vote between the major party candidates from each state. The data is 
divided by state and by the type of election, whether both candidates accepted public funding, 
one accepted public funding, or neither accepted public funding. The last row shows the overall 
average vote margin among major party elections. 
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Table 19: Vote Margin by Acceptance of Public Funding in Districts by State 
 
Arizona Connecticut Maine Minnesota 
Neither Candidate Accepted Public Funding 29.70% 42.06% 34.67% 14.89% 
One Candidate Accepted Public Funding 26.36% 38.71% 24.38% 30.49% 
Both Candidates Accepted Public Funding 16.53% 19.41% 18.56% 23.51% 
Average Vote Margin of State 23.79% 25.80% 21.01% 24.05% 
 
This table shows that there is a decrease in the margin of the vote for each candidate that 
accepts funding for all states except Minnesota. This finding follows my hypothesis, since it 
confirms Malhotra’s conclusion on the Maine and Arizona programs as well as Donnay and 
Ramsden’s conclusion on their analysis of Minnesota’s program. One aspect of the data that is 
somewhat surprising is that the difference in vote margin between elections where neither 
candidate accepted funding and where both candidates accepted funding was greatest in 
Connecticut’s elections, with a change of about 23 percent. Comparatively, Arizona’s difference 
was about thirteen percent while Maine’s was about 16. Although I was also surprised that 
Minnesota’s elections were least competitive when one candidate accepted public funding, this 
result could be explained if the one candidate that is accepting funding is the incumbent, since it 
would follow Donnay and Ramsden’s conclusion that grants typically help the incumbents in 
Minnesota. 
Discussion of Data Analysis: 
In analyzing the outcome of my first research question using the percentage of candidates 
that accepted public funding among the 2008 and 2010 legislative elections for each state, I 
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determined that my hypothesis was wrong. Although I thought that Arizona and Connecticut 
would have the highest percentage of candidates that accepted public funding while Minnesota’s 
would have the lowest percentage of candidates that accepted public funding, Minnesota’s 
elections had by far the highest percentage of candidates who used their program, then Maine, 
then Connecticut, with Arizona having the lowest percentage. The decrease in percentage of 
candidates that accepted public funding between 2008 and 2010 in Arizona and Connecticut 
could be attributed to the Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett decision 
and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals case, which might have decreased a candidate’s 
incentive to accept funding, since candidates could have been worried that they would not have 
enough funds during their campaign, this could be particularly important if they are a challenger 
where the incumbent did not accept funding, since challengers would not be able to increase their 
spending accordingly. Since Minnesota’s program differs from the others, it makes sense that 
there would not be a similar decline, however, it is odd that there was not a change in Maine 
between the 2008 and 2010 elections since they have a very similar program to Arizona and 
Connecticut. 
After looking at competitive elections, I looked at the percentage of unopposed 
candidates who accepted public funding. This data seemed to reflect the overall percentage of 
major party candidates who accepted public funding such that Minnesota had the highest 
percentage of major party candidates who accepted public funding, then Maine, then Connecticut, 
and then Arizona had the lowest percentage of major party candidates accept public funding. It is 
strange that Minnesota’s unopposed candidates agreed to abide by their programs rules at such 
high rates since they are restricted in spending and they could not receive subsidies since they 
were unopposed. In some cases, candidates that accepted could have been in a party dominant 
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district where they faced a challenger in the primary, so they used subsidies, and then decided to 
maintain their acceptance of public funding for the general election.  
Next, I looked at the data separated by election type: both candidates accepted, one 
candidate accepted, and neither candidate accepted public funding in order to find what 
percentage of candidates for each type of competitive election accepted public funding for each 
legislative election. Although this data was somewhat restricted for Arizona since I could only 
use the 2008 and 2010 Senate data, it still gives an indication of the program as a whole. The 
percentage of districts in which two candidates accepted public funding decreased from 50% to 
15% between the two elections in Arizona. Connecticut also saw a decrease in the percentage of 
districts in which both candidates accepted between 2008 and 2010 or they could have applied 
without knowing that they would be unopposed in the general election. Maine had a similar 
decrease, but only in the Senate elections. Overall, Minnesota had the highest percentage of 
districts where both candidates accepted public funding, then Connecticut, then Maine, and 
Arizona had the lowest percentage. 
In analyzing the data, I found that my hypothesis for my second research question was 
partly correct. I found that there is an increase in competitiveness when public funding is used in 
all states except Minnesota. Additionally, for the legislative elections that I analyzed there is an 
increase from when one major party candidate accepts funding to two candidates accepting for 
each state except Minnesota, where elections are most competitive when neither major party 
candidate accepts public funding and they are least competitive when one candidate accepts 
public funding. This seemed to support my hypothesis as well as what Malhotra found in Maine 
and Arizona and what Donnay and Ramsden found in Minnesota. I was surprised that 
Connecticut’s elections increased in competitiveness the most between elections where neither 
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candidate accepted and elections where both candidates accepted. Although my hypothesis was 
partially wrong because I hypothesized that Arizona’s elections would have the largest decrease 
in vote margin because they have large districts which makes any increase in spending more 
significant than if their districts were smaller. My hypothesis that Minnesota’s elections would 
see the smallest increase in competitiveness was correct.  
In general, it seems counterintuitive that Minnesota had the highest percentage of 
candidates who accepted public funding while they had an increase in vote margin when public 
funding was used by both major party candidates since it seems from the data that accepting 
subsidies actually hurt the competitiveness of elections in Minnesota. 
From this data analysis, I determined that my hypothesis that Arizona would have the 
highest percentage of candidates who accepted public funding was incorrect while my hypothesis 
that Minnesota would have the lowest increase in competitiveness was correct.   
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
Introduction: 
In this thesis, I discussed the effects of public funding by reviewing past literature on public 
funding, presented theories pertaining to public funding, provided a history of the 
implementation of various campaign financing laws, and provided insight on the states that 
currently have public funding programs. Next, I explained the public funding programs in 
Minnesota, Maine, Arizona, and Connecticut, highlighting differences between each program 
that could have an effect on their competitiveness. Then, I analyzed data that I collected on state 
legislative elections in Connecticut, Maine, Arizona, and Minnesota in order to answer my 
research questions, which were: “ Among the states that provide full public funding for their 
legislative candidates, which state is most successfully able to provide public funding programs 
that incentivize their state legislative candidates to accept the limitations of their public financing 
laws?” and “Which state has the most competitive elections among major party legislative 
candidates who accept public funding for their campaigns?” Finally, I provided the results from 
my data analysis, discussing how the results differed from my hypotheses. 
Discussion of Findings: 
For my first research question, I hypothesized that Maine, Connecticut, and Arizona 
would have similar success in their ability to provide public funding programs because they each 
offer similar public funding options, while Minnesota would be less able to incentivize 
candidates because Minnesota’s program offered subsidies as opposed to full public funding, 
which could adversely affect elections’ competitiveness. 
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I determined that my hypothesis was incorrect, finding that Minnesota had the highest 
percentage of candidates who accepted public funding, followed by Maine, then Connecticut, 
and Arizona having the lowest percentage. This could partly be attributed to Arizona Free 
Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals case 
that were both being decided during the 2010 election cycle, since there was a decline in the 
percentage of candidates who accepted public funding in Arizona and Connecticut between 2008 
and 2010, while these cases were being decided. This could also explain why there was not a 
similar decline in Maine in 2010. 
For my second research question, I hypothesized that Arizona would have the most 
competitive elections among major party legislative candidates who accept public funding for 
their campaigns since Malhotra found that Arizona had more competitive elections than Maine 
because Arizona has larger districts so providing more money to candidates makes a bigger 
impact than in Maine, and since Connecticut also has significantly smaller districts than Arizona 
I hypothesized that Arizona would have the most competitive elections followed by Connecticut 
and Maine. I hypothesized that Minnesota would be the least competitive state because 
Minnesota’s program is a more limited program, being a subsidy program instead of a full public 
funding program, which does not seem to aid challengers as much as the full public funding 
programs in Connecticut, Maine, and Arizona.  
I found that my hypothesis for my second research question was partly correct. I found an 
increase in competitiveness when public funding is used in all states except Minnesota, in which 
there was actually a significant decrease between districts where neither candidate accepted 
subsidies and districts where both candidates accepted subsidies. However, I was party incorrect 
in my hypothesis because Connecticut had the largest difference in the vote margin between 
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districts where neither candidate accepted public funding and districts where both candidates 
accepted public funding when I hypothesized that Arizona would have the largest difference. 
This could partly be attributed to the limitation in Arizona’s data, since there was only 
information for the Senate elections. It could also be attributed to the Supreme Court’s decision 
on Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett because fewer candidates 
accepted public funding, making the data limited which could explain why there was a large 
difference between the vote margins between 2008 and 2010 in both Arizona and Connecticut. 
Impact of Public Funding on Democracy: 
One of the most important factors that could have affected the results for both my 
research questions was the Supreme Court’s decision on Arizona Free Enterprise Club's 
Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett. Although there was a large decline in the percentage of 
candidates who accepted funding between 2008 and 2010 after the Court’s decision for each 
election except Maine’s Senate election, acceptance rates were still fairly high on average, with 
Arizona having the lowest percentage at 63.57%. This shows that public funding programs in 
each of the states that were studied have been successfully able to attract candidates to their 
programs. Additionally, despite the changes that have occurred as a result of Arizona Free 
Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, it still appeared that public funding enhanced 
competitiveness in the 2010 Maine, Arizona, and Connecticut elections, after the case prevented 
candidates from receiving a larger matching grants when their opponent outspends more than 
their initial grant.  
It is clear from the data analysis on the difference in election competitiveness between the 
types of public funding programs that full public funding programs, such as the programs in 
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Maine, Arizona, and Connecticut are much more successful at increasing the competitiveness of 
elections while subsidy programs as in Minnesota, can actually decrease in competitiveness 
when both major party candidates accept subsidies. 
Furthermore, this analysis has remained consistent with past literature that has been 
written on campaign financing. It shows that Minnesota could have decreased in competitiveness 
because the spending limits are too low for challengers to successfully compete with incumbents. 
Additionally, it is consistent with past literature because, for each of the programs with full 
public funding, election competitiveness was higher when both major party candidates accepted 
funding. Which further demonstrates Malhotra’s conclusion that an increase in funding benefits 
the challenger because candidates are able to have a larger amount of funding earlier on in an 
election. 
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Appendix 
All information provided here is from sources found on Minnesota, Maine, Arizona, and 
Connecticut governmental websites. Full citation can be found in the bibliography.  
The table below is the Biennial Adjustment chart for Arizona’s 2008 election cycle. This 
shows the adjusted contribution limits and expenditure limits for candidates, which, pursuant to 
their public financing law, is done for each election cycle. This information is provided by 
Arizona Secretary of State’s Office “Clean Elections Act 2007 Biennial Adjustments” (Arizona 
Secretary of State’s Office 2007). 
 
Clean  Elections  Act  2007  Biennial  Adjustments
Pursuant  to  A.R.S.§16--959(A)
Participating  Candidate  Expenditure  &  Contribution  Limits  for  2008  Elections
Office
Primary
Election
Spending
Limits
A.R.S.§16--
961(G)*
General
Election
Spending
Limits
A.R.S.§16--
961(H)*
Maximum
Independent
Expenditure
Limit
A.R.S.§16--
941(D)
Maximum
Early
Contributions
(Aggregate)
A.R.S.§16--
945(A)(2)
Maximum
Early
Contributions
(Individual)
A.R.S.§16--
945(A)(1)
Maximum
Personal
Contributions
A.R.S.§16--
941(A)(2)
Governor $638,222 $957,333 $610 $49,180 $130 $1,230
Secretary  Of
State $165,378 $248,067 $610 $25,840 $130 $1,230
Attorney
General $165,378 $248,067 $610 $25,840 $130 $1,230
Treasurer $82,680 $124,020 $610 $12,920 $130 $1,230
Superintendent
Of  Public
Instruction
$82,680 $124,020 $610 $12,920 $130 $1,230
Corporation
Commissioner $82,680 $124,020 $610 $12,920 $130 $1,230
Mine  Inspector $41,349 $62,024 $610 $6,460 $130 $1,230
Legislature $12,921 $19,382 $610 $3,230 $130 $610
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The table below, “Clean Elections Act 2009-2010 Biennial Adjustments,” shows the 
biennial adjustment for Arizona’s 2010 election, using the same criteria as the previous table 
(Arizona Secretary of State’s Office 2009). 
 
Below is a table for the qualifying threshold for Connecticut state Senate and state House 
candidates from the State Elections Enforcement Commission’s Citizens’ Election Program 
“Basic Requirements-2010 Overview,” which were requirements used in both the 2008 and 2010 
Clean  Elections  Act  2009--2010  Biennial  Adjustments
Pursuant  to  A.R.S.§16--959(A)
Participating  Candidate  Expenditure  &  Contribution  Limits  for  2010  Elections
Office
Primary
Election
Spending
Limits
A.R.S.§16--
961(G)
General
Election
Spending
Limits
A.R.S.§16--
961(H)
Maximum
Independent
Expenditure
Limit
A.R.S.§16--
941(D)
Maximum
Early
Contributions
(Aggregate)
A.R.S.§16--
945(A)(2)
Maximum
Early
Contributions
(Individual)
A.R.S.§16--
945(A)(1)
Maximum
Personal
Contributions
A.R.S.§16--
941(A)(2)
Governor $707,447 $1,061,171 $640 $51,250 $140 $1,280
Secretary  Of
State $183,311 $274,967 $640 $45,828 $140 $1,280
Attorney
General $183,311 $274,967 $640 $45,828 $140 $1,280
Treasurer $91,645 $137,468 $640 $22,911 $140 $1,280
Superintendent
Of  Public
Instruction
$91,645 $137,468 $640 $22,911 $140 $1,280
Corporation
Commissioner $91,645 $137,468 $640 $22,911 $140 $1,280
Mine  Inspector $45,838 $68,757 $640 $11,460 $140 $1,280
Legislature $14,319 $21,479 $640 $3,580 $140 $640
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elections (State Elections Enforcement Commission 2010, 2). 
 
The table below also shows requirements for Connecticut candidates for the 2008 and 
2010 election cycles, showing the grant amount that each type of candidate can receive when 
accepted to the public funding program (State Elections Enforcement Commission 2010, 5). 
 
The table below is also for Connecticut candidates who receive public funding, detailing 
the expenditure limits before they are accepted to their public funding program (State Elections 
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Enforcement Commission 2010, 8). 
 
The following page is the total distribution on public funding to candidates for Maine 
from 2000 to 2008 and the breakdown of public funding for 2008 (MCEA 2009, 2). 
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The next two pages below show the information on full public funding 
programs,including Veromont, Maine, Arizona, and Connecticut (NCSL 2007). For the purpose 
of this study, Vermont was excluded for the data since their full public funding is only for 
gubernatorial races (NCSL 2007).  
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Below is information on the total amount of subsidies provided to Minnesota’s candidates 
(MCFPDB 2013b). 
  
 
PUBLIC FINANCING 
DIRECT PAYMENTS AND POLITICAL CONTRIBUTION REFUNDS         
  
Political parties and candidates for state offices who agree to limit their campaign spending during an 
election cycle may receive direct payments (public subsidy program) and issue contribution receipts that 
are reimbursable to contributors up to established limits (political contributions refund program). The 
state's expenditures on these programs are shown in the following table. (Minn. Stat. §10A.322.) 
 
 1994 and 1998 – Constitutional Office (C) and House of Representative Candidates (H) 
 1996 and 2000 – Senate (S) and House of Representative Candidates (H) 
 2004 and 2008 – House of Representative Candidates (H) 
     2002, 2006 and 2010 – Constitutional Office (C), Senate (S), and House of Representative (H)  
               
ELECTION YEAR CANDIDATES PARTIES TOTAL 
    Direct 
Payments 
Pol. Contr. 
Refunds 
Direct 
Payments 
Pol. Contr. 
Refunds 
  
       
C-H 1994 $4,029,600  $2,590,062  $138,481  $1,174,142  $7,932,285  
       
--  1995 0 1,251,212 102,922 1,718,890 3,073,024 
       
S-H 1996 3,985,332 2,423,185 141,794 2,119,361 8,669,672 
       
-- 1997 0 1,320,330 104,068 2,113,268 3,537,666 
       
C-H 1998 3,891,560 2,732,657 96,645 2,223,207 8,944,069 
       
-- 1999 0 1,391,596 100,583 2,420,940 3,913,119 
       
S-H 2000 3,227,600 2,498,986 72,630 2,757,914 8,557,130 
       
-- 2001 0 1,377,521 86,891 2,818,433 4,282,845 
       
C-S-H 2002 4,442,832 3,379,344 110,002 3,138,637 11,070,815 
       
-- 2003 0 1,276,023 115,312 3,334,953 4,726,288 
       
H 2004 1,736,166 2,176,837 106,024 4,167,619 8,186,646 
       
-- 2005 0 1,672,912 107,736 3,230,838 5,011,486 
       
C-S-H 2006 4,796,523 2,951,200 95,424 3,252,821 11,095,968 
       
-- 2007 0 1,205,155 97,795 3,193,731 4,496,681 
       H 2008 1,608,105 2,045,086 90,712 4,024,797 7,768,760 
       
-- 2009 0 1,164,267 87,208 2,618,555 3,870,030 
       C-S-H 2010 3,998,646 0 81,261 0 4,079,907 
 
 
     
 
TOTALS $31,716,424  $31,456,373  $1,735,488  $44,308,106  $109,216,391  
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